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ABSTRACT 
 
This article addresses whether the DNA Act (which requires DNA samples from arrestees) 
passes constitutional muster. I argue that the act is constitutional and that if society believes the 
collection of DNA from arrestees violates an individual’s privacy, it should seek legislative 
resolution and not seek the protection of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. Throughout 
my analysis, I demonstrate why DNA collection is constitutional and how it is necessary. Part I 
of this article examines the history of DNA sampling, case law establishing an arrestee’s 
expectation of privacy, and the applicable Fourth Amendment tests. Part II examines the 
arguments for and against DNA sampling by considering case law at the state and federal level, 
and explores the significance of junk DNA and the treatment of abandoned DNA. Part III is the 
personal analysis section, which argues that the totality of circumstances test is the proper test. I 
apply the test to determine that there is minimal intrusion of an arrestee’s expectation of privacy 
through DNA sampling, a legitimate governmental interest, and that warrants are unnecessary. 
Further, the section demonstrates why DNA sampling is a natural progression from fingerprint 
collection, and the section analyzes abandoned DNA and DNA sampling. Part IV concludes the 
article by stating that the Fourth Amendment is not violated and that society must turn to 
Congress to seek greater protection. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Technological developments have changed the methods used by both criminals and law 
enforcement.  As technology has improved, criminals have found new ways to carry out 
unlawful activity.  In response, law enforcement has adopted modern technology to enhance its 
ability to combat crime.  However, the use of improved methods to catch criminals to 
counterbalance the improved methods of committing crimes has raised constitutional concerns.  
For example, current legislation  allows law enforcement to require any individual arrested of a 
crime—regardless of innocence or guilt—to provide a DNA sample, along with the usual 
fingerprint collection and mug shot.
1
  It has been questioned whether forcing an individual to 
provide a DNA sample is contrary to any constitutional limitations however, a recent Third 
Circuit decision has concluded that the legislation passes constitutional muster.
2
  
With the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005
3
 (“DNA Act”), Congress expanded the power of 
law enforcement by authorizing the collection of DNA samples from arrestees.
4
  To obtain a 
DNA sample from an individual, law enforcement essentially only needs to arrest that person.
5
  
Obtaining DNA via arrest therefore does not necessarily require a warrant, giving great 
                                                 
*
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1
 Violence Against Women and Department Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 
2960 (2006). 
2
 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1741 (2012). 
3
 Violence Against Women and Department Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, supra note 1.  
4
 Id. 
5
 Id. 
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discretion to law enforcement (especially considering that law enforcement is permitted to  
collect DNA samples from the arrestees after establishing probable cause).
6
  Furthermore, given 
that DNA sample collection is performed via a buccal swab or a blood extraction, all forms of 
DNA collection result in a minimal level of bodily intrusion.
7
  Under the federal law, once a 
DNA sample is collected, a DNA profile is created and uploaded onto the Combined DNA Index 
System (“CODIS”).8 Technically, the DNA profile consists of so-called “Junk DNA:” non-
coding DNA,  for which the scientists have yet to decipher its purpose.
9
  In order to go from a 
DNA sample (which contains genome traits) to a DNA profile (which does not contain genome 
traits), the laboratories, which receive the DNA sample, must locate the thirteen core genetic loci 
used in CODIS.
10
 Even with the extraction of this additional information, courts have not found a 
constitutional violation.
11
  Instead, courts have ruled that this type of collection is a search.
12
  
Thus, the only true question is the reasonableness of those searches for arrestees. 
                                                 
6
 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 412 (“DNA collection occurs only after it has been determined that there is probable cause to 
believe that the arrestee committed a crime.”). 
7
 See Memorandum from Att’y  Gen. Eric H. Holder Jr., on DNA Sample Collection from Fed. Arrestees and 
Defendants for Asst. Att’y Gen., Criminal Division 2, 3 (Nov. 2010) (“The authorized method of DNA sample 
collection from non-convicts in the federal jurisdiction is by buccal (cheek) swab…The Probation Offices have 
collected DNA (in the form of blood samples) from convicted offenders”), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/ag-memo-dna-collection111810.pdf [hereinafter Holder Memorandum].  
8
 42 U.S.C. § 14135 (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
9
 Solomon Moore, In a Lab, an Ever-Growing Database of DNA Profiles, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/science/12quan.html. 
10
 See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA Index System, FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Oct. 27, 
2012) (“The DNA profile . . . is stored in the database.  For Forensic STR DNA analysis, the DNA profile consists 
of one or two alleles at the 13 CODIS core loci.”). 
11
 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 400-01 (“STRs are useful for identification not because of any genetic information but 
because they ‘result[] in different numbers of copies of repeated sequences.” (citing Henry T. Greely et al., Family 
Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248, 249 (2006))). 
12
 See United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Requiring Sczubelek to give a blood sample 
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.”); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (“[T]his 
physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable.”). 
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 In United States v. Mitchell,
13
 the Third Circuit addressed the reasonableness of DNA 
sampling of arrestees.  The court held that DNA fingerprinting is akin to fingerprint collection in 
that the arrestees and the pretrial detainees have a diminished expectation of privacy in their 
identities; therefore, the collection of a DNA sample is reasonable and does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.
14
  The court applied the “totality of circumstances” test and based its 
reasoning on case-law that dealt with the collection of DNA samples from convicted felons.
15
 
The DNA Act presents an intriguing challenge for courts by introducing  the question of 
whether the Fourth Amendment provides an arrested individual with a high enough expectation 
of privacy that would prevent law enforcement from obtaining a DNA sample without the 
intervention of a judicial magistrate.
16
  Courts have treated DNA fingerprinting as a natural 
technological progression from simple fingerprint analysis.
17
 However, courts should engage in a 
careful analysis before deciding that a technological progression of an already established 
procedure passes constitutional muster.  They should consider all the safeguards and necessary 
precautions before finding that progression to be constitutional.  For instance, in Kyllo v. United 
States,
18
 the Supreme Court held that thermal imaging of a home, showing the emanation of 
relative amounts of heat, is unconstitutional even though observing a home from the outside is an 
                                                 
13
 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011). 
14
 Id. at 413. 
15
 Id. at 415-16. 
16
 See People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (“[T]o the extent [the DNA Act] requires 
felony arrestees to submit a DNA sample . . . without independent suspicion, a warrant or even a judicial or grand 
jury determination of probable cause, unreasonably intrudes on such arrestees’ expectation of privacy and is invalid 
under the Fourth Amendment …”). 
17
 See Johnson v. Ogershok, 4:02-CV-1525, 2004 WL 3622383, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2004) (“We find that the 
ability of law enforcement to now collect and keep DNA samples is simply a technological progression of 
photographs and fingerprints which have long been permitted to be kept for convicted persons in order to maintain a 
complete and more thorough database for identifying purposes.”). 
18
 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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established constitutional procedure.
19
  The distinguishing fact from Kyllo was that the thermal 
imaging observed an activity that was occurring inside a home, which is private.
20
  DNA 
sampling could be a greater intrusion into a citizen’s privacy than fingerprint collection because 
it has the capability of revealing far more information than fingerprints.
21
  Consequently, 
“[f]ingerprinting presents no [substantial] threat to privacy” as compared with DNA 
fingerprinting.
22
  However, the analogous “distinguishing fact” does not exist for DNA 
samplings, the Fourth Amendment should not be used as a blanket protection, and DNA 
sampling of arrestees, with the proper safeguards, should not be deemed a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.
23
 
In the past, courts have provided greater protections to  individuals from constitutional 
violations, especially in the Fourth Amendment cases.  For instance, in Schmerber v. State of 
California,
24
 Justice Brennan stated that “[t]he interests in human dignity and privacy which the 
Fourth Amendment protects forbid [intrusions beyond the body’s surface] on the mere chance 
that desired evidence might be obtained.”25  However, with the improvements in technology, the 
courts’ interpretation of the Constitution has moved further from Justice Brennan’s belief and 
treaded towards an interpretation that makes the Constitution seem archaic, and incapable of 
                                                 
19
 Id. at 40. See also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 731 (1984) (“When a person’s property is concealed from 
public view . . . then the fact of his possession is private and the subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
20
 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (“Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore 
details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 
‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”). 
21
 See Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2012) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (“Even with today’s 
technology . . . junk DNA reveals more information than a fingerprint.”). 
22
 Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 769. 
23
 See United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903, 912 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“The Attorney General regulations describe 
that the DNA will be taken during the identification process after the arrest. . . . [T]he statute also contains privacy 
protections and imposes criminal and financial penalties for improper use of DNA samples.”). 
24
 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
25
 Id. at 770. 
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protecting against intrusions into privacy as a result of modern technological advances.
26
  In 
order for the Constitution (more specifically, the Fourth Amendment) to survive technological 
advances, courts must implement proper safeguards  to protect against methods that could violate 
the Fourth Amendment standards. The technological progression of an established procedure 
does not necessarily mean that such a progression is constitutional.  
Part I of this Comment will describe the historical development of DNA fingerprinting.  
This section will explain the emergence of the use of DNA extraction for probationers and 
convicted felons and examine case-law to determine an arrestee’s expectation of privacy.  It will 
conclude by examining the applicable Fourth Amendment tests.  Part II will discuss recent 
relevant case-law that examines the reasonableness of DNA fingerprints.  This section will also 
explore the significance of “Junk DNA,” and the treatment of abandoned DNA.  Part III will 
explain  why I believe that DNA fingerprinting, with the proper safeguards, is constitutional 
under the Fourth Amendment.  It will determine the proper Fourth Amendment test, establish 
how that test relates to DNA sampling, compare fingerprints to DNA sampling, and analyze 
abandoned DNA. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
Consistent with the advances in technology, law enforcement has been implementing 
increasingly sophisticated equipment  to catch criminals.
27
  Although these methods have 
                                                 
26
 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (“[I]t is obvious that this physical intrusion, 
penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognized as 
reasonable.”). 
27
 See Ellen Messmer, FBI Turns up Faster, More Accurate Fingerprint Identification System, COMPUTERWORLD 
(Mar. 9, 2011), http://computerworld.co.nz/news.nsf/security/fbi-turns-up-faster-more-accurate-fingerprint-
identification-system (“The FBI . . . said it’s made a long-awaited switch from its Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System (AFIS) to an upgraded, faster one the FBI calls Advanced Fingerprint Information Technology 
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significantly aided law enforcement officials in apprehending offenders,  the constitutionality of 
such methods has been a cause of concern.  DNA fingerprinting is one such procedure where 
courts have struggled to determine its constitutionality.
28
  The history of DNA sampling 
demonstrates the law’s formulation and its expansion into the collection of samples from 
arrestees. 
 
A. Examination of the DNA Extraction Statutes 
In 1984, Alex Jeffreys created the idea of DNA fingerprinting as a method of identifying 
individuals based on their DNA.
29
  The 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 
resulted from this basic development, establishing CODIS by making “funds available. . . to 
carry out all or a substantial part of a program or project intended to develop or improve the 
capability to analyze [DNA] in a forensic laboratory.”30  Six years later, Congress enacted the 
DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 (“DNA Analysis Act”)  to enable the Bureau of 
Prisons Director to collect a DNA sample from every convicted prisoner (of a qualifying federal 
offense).
31
  The DNA Analysis Act focused on individuals convicted of certain federal crimes, 
along with those who were incarcerated, paroled, and on probation or supervised release.
32
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(AFIT).”); Kim Zetter, Battle Brews Over FBI’s Warrantless GPS Tracking, WIRED (May 9, 2011, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/05/gps/ (“Rumors had been swirling among activists that the FBI might be 
using GPS to track them …”).  
28
 Compare United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that collection of DNA samples from 
arrestees is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment) with People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2011) (holding that DNA sample collection without “independent suspicion, warrant or judicial or grand jury 
determination of probable cause” violates an arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights). 
29
 DNA’s Twists of History, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Feb. 16, 2003), 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/culture/articles/030224/24dna.b.htm. 
30
 42 U.S.C. § 3796kk (2006). 
31
 42 U.S.C. §14135a (2006). 
32
 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 2004).  
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In 2004, the DNA Analysis Act was expanded to qualify all felonies for DNA sampling.
33
  
The expansion continued, and by 2006, the DNA Analysis Act  allowed the “Attorney General . . 
. [to] collect DNA samples from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted or 
from non-United States persons who are detained under the authority of the United States.”34  
Currently, all fifty states and the federal government have enacted laws requiring DNA 
collection from an offender.
35
  Moreover, twenty-five states and the federal government have 
passed legislation requiring the collection of a DNA sample upon arrest for certain felonies.
36
 
After collecting the DNA sample, DNA profiles are generated.  The DNA profiles are 
used for identification purposes, much like fingerprints and mug-shots.
37
  The FBI creates the 
DNA profile by using “short tandem repeat (STR) technology to analyze repeating sequences 
found at thirteen specific regions, or loci, on an individual’s DNA.”38  Profiles are created by 
using “junk DNA”—“DNA that differs from one individual to the next and thus can be used for 
purposes of identification but which was ‘purposely selected because [it is] not associated with 
any known physical or medical characteristics’ and ‘do[es] not control or influence the 
expression of any trait.’”39  In order to maintain confidentiality, “the profiles contain only ‘an 
agency identifier for the agencies submitting the DNA profile; the specimen identification 
                                                 
33
 United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 942 (9th Cir. 2007). 
34
 42 U.S.C. § 14135(a)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
35
 Fact Sheet: Legislation to Advance Justice Through DNA Technology, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/dnalegislation.htm (“All 50 states and the federal government have laws requiring that 
DNA be collected from some categories of offenders.”) (last visited November 18, 2012). 
36
 Protecting the Public with Arrestee DNA Database Legislation, DNARESOURCE.COM 
http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/Privacytalkingpoints.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2012). 
37
 Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 2010) (“DNA profiles currently function as identification records not 
unlike fingerprints, photographs, or social security numbers.”). 
38
 Id. at 65-66. 
39
 United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting H.R.REP. NO. 106-900(I), at 27 (2000)). 
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number; the DNA profile; and the name of the DNA personnel associated with the DNA 
analysis.’”40  After the profile is created, it is entered into CODIS. 
Safeguards in the DNA Analysis Act prevent the improper use of DNA samples.
41
  The 
DNA Analysis Act states that “[a] person who knowingly discloses a sample or result . . . to any 
person not authorized to receive it, or obtains or uses, without authorization . . . shall be fined not 
more than $250,000, or imprisoned for a period of not more than one year.”42  Furthermore, the: 
Crime Control Act limits disclosure “to criminal justice agencies for law 
enforcement identification purposes;” “in judicial proceedings, if otherwise 
admissible;” “for criminal defense purposes, to a defendant who shall have access 
to samples or analyses performed in connection with the case in which such 
defendant is charged;” and, “if personally identifiable information is removed, for 
a population statistics database, for identification research and protocol 
development purposes, or for quality control purposes.”43 
 
 
 
B. What is an Arrestee’s Expectation of Privacy 
1. Schmerber v. State of California 
In Schmerber v. California,
44
 the Supreme Court addressed whether an arrestee’s Fourth 
Amendment rights were violated when law enforcement took his blood sample against his will.
45
  
Police arrested the defendant at a hospital for driving while intoxicated, and  also directed a 
physician to withdraw a blood sample from the defendant’s body.46  Even though the defendant 
objected, a physician took a blood sample  and an analysis of the “sample revealed a percent by 
                                                 
40
 Id. at 4. 
41
 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 399 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[The DNA Analysis Act] . . . includes a number of 
safeguards to prevent the improper use of DNA samples.”). 
42
 42 U.S.C. § 14135e(c) (2006). 
43
 42 U.S.C. § 14133(b)(2) (2006). 
44
 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
45
 Id. at 766-67. 
46
 Id. at 758. 
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weight of alcohol in his blood at the time of the offense which indicated intoxication.”47  The 
defendant argued that the withdrawal of his blood constituted an unreasonable search and seizure 
in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
48
  Ultimately, the Supreme Court held “that the 
Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual’s body under 
stringently limited conditions [and this decision] in no way indicates that [the Court] permits 
more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.”49 
The Court acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect an 
individual’s privacy and dignity by preventing unwarranted State intrusion.50  However, the 
Court noted that “the Fourth Amendment’s proper function is to constrain, not against all 
intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which 
are made in an improper manner.”51  Thus, in this case, the Court had to determine if the police 
were justified in requiring the defendant to provide a blood test and whether the taking of his 
blood was reasonable.
52
 
The Court recognized that the officer was reasonably confronted with an emergency 
because the delay that would have resulted from acquiring a warrant could have  destroyed 
potential evidence.
53
  Conversely, the Court noted that the Fourth Amendment protects  interests 
in human dignity and privacy, and the possibility that evidence may be obtained (or destroyed) is 
                                                 
47
 Id. at 759. 
48
 Id.  
49
 Id. at 772. 
50
 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to 
protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”). 
51
 Id. at 768. 
52
 Id. (the Court considered “whether the police were justified in requiring petitioner to submit to the blood test, and 
whether the means and procedures employed in taking his blood respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards of 
reasonableness.”).  
53
 Id. at 770 (“[The officer] might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the 
delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened ‘the destruction of evidence.’”). 
13 PGH. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1 (2012)        10 
 
not a sufficient justification for allowing physical intrusions into an individual’s body.54  Thus, in 
order to narrow the types of intrusions that contravene human dignity and privacy, the Court 
stated that absent “a clear indication that in fact . . . evidence will be found, these fundamental 
human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless 
there is an immediate search.”55  To determine if this  narrow interpretation applied to this case, 
the Court had to ascertain whether the officer could draw inferences or needed to acquire a 
warrant before administering the blood test.
56
 
Search warrants are typically required to search an individual’s home so,  the court ruled 
that unless an emergency existed, intrusions into an individual’s body required a search 
warrant.
57
  The Court held, “[t]he requirement that a warrant be obtained is a requirement that 
inferences to support the search ‘be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being 
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’”58  A 
search warrant involves a judge who is capable of providing an opinion based on the objective 
facts presented and not on any subjective beliefs or inclinations stemming from the arrestee or 
the situation.
59
 
Although the Court stressed the importance and necessity of a search warrant, it 
concluded that the circumstances did not require the officer to obtain a warrant in this case 
because the individual’s blood alcohol level was diminishing and there was an increased 
                                                 
54
 Id. at 769-70 (“The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such 
intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained.”). 
55
 Id. at 770 (the Court considered “whether the arresting officer was permitted to draw [. . .] inferences himself, or 
was required instead to procure a warrant before proceeding with the test.”). 
56
 Schmerber v. United States, 384 U.S. 770 (1966). 
57
 Id. (“Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and absent an emergency, no less could be 
required where intrusions into the human body are concerned.”). 
58
 Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)). 
59
 See id. (“The importance of informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the issue whether or not to 
invade another’s body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great.”). 
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possibility that evidence would be lost.
60
 Consequently, the Court held that based on these 
special facts,  “the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case was an 
appropriate incident to petitioner’s arrest.”61 
 
2. Winston v. Lee 
Almost twenty years after Schmerber, the Supreme Court ruled on another case involving 
the Fourth Amendment rights of an arrestee in Winston v. Lee.
62
  In Winston, the question was 
whether compelling a surgical intrusion against an individual’s  will implicates a reasonable 
expectation of privacy rendering  the surgical intrusion unreasonable, even if evidence  is 
produced by the search.
63
  The Court determined that “[t]he reasonableness of surgical intrusions 
beneath the skin depends on a case-by-case approach, in which the individual’s interests in 
privacy and security are weighed against society’s interests in conducting the procedure to obtain 
evidence for fairly determining guilt or innocence.”64  
Accordingly, the Court turned to Schmerber’s consideration of other factors in 
determining reasonableness, such as the threat to the individual’s health, the intrusion upon the 
individual’s dignity, and the community’s interests in ensuring that the correct individuals were 
held accountable for their crimes.
65
  The Court emphasized that Schmerber “cautioned: ‘[t]hat 
[the Court’s holding] that the Constitution does not forbid the States[’] minor intrusions into an 
individual’s body under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more 
                                                 
60
 Id. at 770-71 (“[T]he percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops . . . [and 
therefore] there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant.”). 
61
 Id. at 770. 
62
 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985). 
63
 Id. at 753-54. 
64
 Id. at 754. 
65
 Id. (“[The Schmerber Court considered] …  the extent to which the procedure may threaten the individual’s safety 
or health, the extent of intrusion upon the individual’s dignity interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity, and 
the community’s interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence.”). 
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substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.’”66  Thus, the Court in Winston held 
that the surgical intrusion was the type of bodily search that Schmerber had cautioned against so, 
permitting such a procedure would violate the individual’s Fourth Amendment right.67 
 To support its decision, the Court assessed the Fourth Amendment and expectation of 
privacy.  Additionally, even though Schmerber did not require a warrant (because it was based 
on exigent circumstances), the Winston court determined that Schmerber provided the proper 
analytical framework for situations where  a court must weigh law enforcement’s need for 
evidence against the individual’s interest in privacy.68  Expectation of privacy is considered one 
of society’s most valuable rights  because it allows individuals to go about their business without 
having to worry about anyone (especially law enforcement) invading their personal space or  
violating their right to be left alone.
69
  The scope of the Fourth Amendment was found to 
“generally [protect] the ‘security’ of ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’ against official 
intrusions up to the point where the community’s need for evidence surmounts a specified 
standard, ordinarily ‘probable cause.’”70  However, the Court conceded that “[b]eyond this point, 
it is ordinarily justifiable for the community to demand that the individual give up some part of 
his interest in privacy and security to advance the community’s vital interests in law 
enforcement; such a search is generally ‘reasonable’ in the Amendment’s terms.”71  In the instant 
case, the Court held that a compelled surgical intrusion for evidence was still an intrusion of an 
                                                 
66
 Id. at 755. 
67
 Id. (“[Surgical intrusion is] . . . an example of the ‘more substantial intrusion’ cautioned against in Schmerber, and 
. . . that to permit the procedure would violate respondent’s right to be secure in his person guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
68
 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985) (“[Schmerber] . . . provides the appropriate framework of analysis for 
[cases where the need for evidence is weighed against an individual’s privacy interest].”). 
69
 See id. at 758 (“[Expectation of privacy is an] . . . individual’s legitimate expectation[] that in certain places and at 
certain times he has ‘the right to be let alone [and is considered] the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men.’”) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
70
 Id. at 759. 
71
 Id.  
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individual’s expectation of privacy, and consequently,  such a search was held to be 
unreasonable regardless of the potential to produce evidence.
72
 
To arrive at this conclusion, the Court examined a number of factors used by the 
Schmerber Court to determine reasonableness.  The effect of the intrusion on the individual’s 
health probably became  the most crucial factor for the Court.
73
  “Notwithstanding the existence 
of probable cause, a search for evidence of a crime may be unjustifiable if it endangers the life or 
health of the suspect.”74  The other factor is the extent to which surgery intrudes upon the 
individual’s dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity.75  Given that the Court 
determined that the Commonwealth had probable cause for the search,  it focused on balancing 
the extent of the intrusion on the individual’s privacy interests against the State’s interests.76 
In applying the facts of this case, the Court noted that general anesthesia surgery, with the 
patient’s consent, is not a demeaning or intrusive procedure, but the “kind of surgery [in this 
case] involves a virtually total divestment of respondent’s ordinary control over surgical probing 
beneath his skin.”77  Additionally, in examining the State’s need for the evidence, the Court 
stated that the Commonwealth already had substantial evidence, which disclosed the origin of the 
bullet, thus diminishing  the need to compel the defendant to undergo surgery.
78
   
Ultimately, the Court held that  Fourth Amendment protections are less stringent when 
there is a  lower expectation of privacy or where there is only a minimal intrusion of privacy.
79
  
                                                 
72
 Id. (“[Surgical intrusion] . . . implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion 
may be ‘unreasonable’ even if likely to produce evidence of a crime.”). 
73
 Id. at 761 (“A crucial factor in analyzing the magnitude of the intrusion . . . is the extent to which the procedure 
may threaten the safety of health of the individual.”). 
74
 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985). 
75
 Id. 
76
 Id. at 763. 
77
 Id. at 764. 
78
 Id. at 765-66. 
79
 Id. 
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However, all searches must still be reasonable and if the State tries to intrude a significantly 
heightened privacy interest, then the State must  provide a substantial justification to classify the 
search as reasonable.
80
 
 
C. Applicable Fourth Amendment Tests 
The Framers created the Fourth Amendment to ensure that “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
[is] not violated” unless a warrant is issued based on probable cause.81  After the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n,82 there was no question as to 
whether DNA extraction was subject to the Fourth Amendment analysis because  the Court “has 
long recognized that a compelled intrusion into the body for blood to be tested . . . and the 
ensuing chemical analysis constitute searches.”83  Thus, the only issue to be resolved is whether 
the DNA sampling of arrestees is reasonable.  
In order to determine whether a search is reasonable, either the “special needs test” or the 
“totality of the circumstances test” must be applied.  Courts were split over which one of these 
two tests governed cases that challenged the reasonableness of DNA extraction statutes.
84
 The 
special needs doctrine was applied in “cases [that] involve[d] searches conducted for important 
non-law enforcement purposes in contexts where adherence to the warrant-and-probable cause 
requirement would be impracticable.”85  However, only a minority of circuits implemented the 
                                                 
80
 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 767 (1985). 
81
 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
82
 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
83
 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 603 (1989). 
84
 Compare Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000) (applying the special needs test), with United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001) (applying the totality of circumstances test). 
85
 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added); see also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 
U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (permitting exceptions when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, 
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special needs test when determining reasonableness for DNA extraction.
86
  Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court has never held that a probationer or parolee should be subjected to a full search 
“at the whim of any law enforcement officer he happens to encounter,” regardless of whether 
there is a reason to suspect that individual of wrongdoing.
87
 
On the other hand, a majority of circuit courts have used the totality of the circumstances 
test for DNA extraction statutes.
88
  Under this approach, reasonableness is determined by 
comparing the degree of intrusion into the individual’s privacy with the degree of intrusion 
needed to promote a legitimate governmental interest.
89
  Courts consider  numerous factors when 
balancing the interests of an individual’s privacy with that of the government’s interest in DNA 
collection.  Generally, the circuits have examined the following: the extent of intrusion required 
for collection, the expectation of privacy enjoyed by the individual, the need for DNA collection 
as a legitimate governmental interest, the safeguards implemented, possibility of expungement, 
                                                                                                                                                             
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.”) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 
351 (1985)). 
86
 See Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[C]onclude that a reasoned interpretation of the ‘special 
needs’ doctrine supports the constitutionality of the DNA statute.”); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 
2004) (holding that the Wisconsin DNA collection statute survives the constitutional attack under the special needs 
doctrine). 
87
 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 859 (2006). 
88
 See United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[T]he totality of the circumstances analysis, rather 
than the special needs analysis, is appropriate.”); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(“[U]nder the totality of circumstances, the taking of a DNA sample from an individual on supervised release is not 
an unreasonable search.”); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 305 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[T]aking of blood samples under 
these circumstances is reasonable.”); Groceman v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(“[C]ollections are reasonable in light of an inmate’s diminished privacy rights, the minimal intrusion involved, and 
the legitimate government interest . . . .”); Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 427 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Ohio DNA statute 
. . . is properly evaluated under the totality-of-the-circumstances test.”); United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924-
25 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[H]old, based on the totality of the circumstances, the collection of DNA under the DNA Act . . 
. does not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure . . . .”); United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 946 (9th Cir. 
2007) (“[C]ontinue to ground our analysis in the totality of circumstances test”); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 
1280 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[A]ddress whether the statute is reasonable under a totality of the circumstances analysis.”); 
Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (joining the “unanimous body of authority” by concluding 
DNA sample collection as reasonable). 
89
 Knights, 534 U.S. at 112-13. 
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and the contribution to solving past crimes.
90
  Under this test, courts found minimal intrusion by 
DNA tests, and also determined that convicted felons and those on supervised release “ha[d] a 
reduced right to privacy—and in particular to privacy of identity[.] . . . Individuals on supervised 
release cannot reasonably expect to keep information bearing on their physical identify from 
government records.”91 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. United States v. Mitchell 
The revolutionary Third Circuit case of Mitchell dealt with whether, after the indictment, 
arrest, and detention, it is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment for the government to 
collect a DNA sample pursuant to the DNA Analysis Act.
92
  In Mitchell, the defendant was 
indicted on one count of attempted possession with the intent to distribute cocaine.
93
  The 
District Court’s analysis, as well as the majority and the dissenting opinions from the Third 
Circuit, are relevant in understanding the arguments presented for and against DNA Sampling. 
 
1. The District Court’s Reasoning 
The District Court applied the totality of the circumstances test and held that “‘Mitchell 
ha[d] a diminished expectation of privacy in his identity’ and thus may be subjected to routine 
booking procedures such as fingerprinting.”94  The District Court did not equate fingerprinting 
identification to DNA profiling because a DNA sample contains “complex, comprehensive, 
                                                 
90
 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 403-05 (3d Cir. 2011). 
91
 Id. at 404 (quoting Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 184-85); see Padgett, 401 F.3d at 1280 (finding that a prisoner has a 
reduced expectation of privacy). 
92
 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 389. 
93
 Id. at 390. 
94
 Id. (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 608 (W.D. Pa. 2009)). 
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[and] inherently private information.”95  More than “a mere progression” from  fingerprinting 
and photographing an arrestee, “[t]he extraction of DNA . . . represents a quantum leap that is 
entirely unnecessary for identification purposes.”96  Furthermore, the District Court compared 
the degree of intrusion that DNA collection brought upon an individual’s privacy with  the extent 
that the government’s interests were promoted.97  Ultimately, the District Court found that the 
government’s interests did not outweigh the defendant’s interests because there was no 
compelling reason to take a DNA sample for identification purposes and therefore, taking the 
defendant’s DNA sample was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.98 
 
2. The Third Circuit’s Analysis 
Contrary to the district court’s decision, the Third Circuit applied the totality of the 
circumstances test and held that the collection of a DNA sample constituted a reasonable search  
under the Fourth Amendment.
99
  In balancing the interests of the government and the defendant, 
the Third Circuit stated that identifying arrestees was the most compelling interest for the 
government.
100
  The Third Circuit found that DNA sampling and matching worked to a greater 
precision than fingerprinting, and therefore, DNA profiles were better for  identifying individuals 
than fingerprints.
101
  The Third Circuit acknowledged that possible misuses of DNA samples is a 
serious concern but ruled that the “hypothetical possibilities are unsupported by the record before 
                                                 
95
 Id. at 412 (internal citations omitted). 
96
 Id. at 412 (internal citations omitted). 
97
 Id. at 390 (quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006)). 
98
 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 391 (3d Cir. 2011). 
99
 Id. at 415-16. 
100
 Id. at 413 (“Most compelling [of the governmental interests] is the Government’s strong interest in identifying 
arrestees.”). 
101
 Id. at 413 (“Given ‘the potentially greater precision of DNA sampling and matching methods,’ DNA profiling 
serves this interest [of identifying individuals] better than fingerprinting.”) (citing United States v. Sczubelek, 402 
F.3d 175, 186 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
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[the court]” and consequently, the court did not factor hypothetical concerns into its totality of 
circumstances analysis.
102
  However, the Third Circuit conceded that if “junk DNA” became 
valuable, then it would be appropriate to reconsider its Fourth Amendment analysis.
103
  Lastly, 
the Third Circuit analogized DNA sampling to fingerprinting: DNA profiles served as genetic 
fingerprints, they were used solely for identification, and information from DNA samples did not 
intrude arrestees' and pretrial detainees' privacy interests due to their diminished expectation of 
privacy.
104
 
Conversely, the dissent in Mitchell held that requiring all arrestees to be swabbed violated 
the principles of the Fourth Amendment.
105
  The dissent did not find  that the government’s 
intent to use an arrestee’s DNA for the purposes of solving other crimes was a compelling 
interest.
106
  The dissent disagreed with the majority’s holding because it essentially held that if an 
individual was wrongfully arrested, the government would still have the right to collect a DNA 
sample, create a DNA profile, and upload that profile onto CODIS.
107
  The dissent was 
uncomfortable with the idea that an arrestee could not protest or prevent the taking of his DNA, 
and would have to obtain a certified final court order that  acquitted the arrestee, and then supply 
it to the government.
108
  Ultimately, the dissent explained that “although his DNA profile will be 
expunged from CODIS, the Government will retain his DNA sample indefinitely.”109 
                                                 
102
 Id. at 408. 
103
 Id.  
104
 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 412 (3d Cir. 2011) (“DNA profiles developed pursuant to the DNA Act 
function as ‘genetic fingerprints’ used only for identification purposes, [and] arrestees and pretrial detainees have 
reduced privacy interests in the information derived from a DNA sample.”). 
105
 Id. at 431 (Rendell, J., dissenting) (“[B]lanket mandate [that all arrestees are to be swabbed] contradicts basic and 
essential Fourth Amendment principles.”). 
106
 Id. at 416 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
107
 Id. at 420 (Rendell, J., dissenting) (“[The Majority’s holding] . . . mean[t] that if a person is arrested for a federal 
crime in a case of mistaken identity (an all-too-common occurrence), the Government has the automatic right to 
sample the arrestee’s DNA, to analyze it, and to include a profile derived from the DNA sample in CODIS.”). 
108
 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d)(1)(A)(ii) (2006)). 
109
 Id.   
13 PGH. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1 (2012)        19 
 
The dissent also determined that there was a difference between being an arrestee and a 
pretrial detainee (like Mitchell),  and a convict, and therefore, the factors considered under the 
totality of the circumstances test would also be different.
110
  The dissent considered the arrestees’ 
expectation of privacy and the pretrial detainees’ expectation of privacy to be much greater than 
that of a convict, thereby reducing  the government’s interest in collecting and analyzing DNA 
samples.
111
 In terms of expectation of privacy, the dissent distinguished convicts from 
arrestees/pretrial detainees:  
Convicts . . . have been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, not just accused 
of a crime. The conviction carries with it a permanent change in the person’s 
status from ordinary citizen to “lawfully adjudicated criminal [  ] . . . whose 
proven conduct substantially heightens the government’s interest in monitoring” 
him and “quite properly carries lasting consequences.” . . . Because they have not 
been adjudged guilty of any crime or suffered any corresponding permanent 
change in their status, arrestees and pretrial detainees necessarily retain a greater 
expectation of privacy than convicts do.
112
 
 
With regard to the compelling governmental interest in analyzing the DNA, the dissent 
stated that unlike in the matter of convicted individuals, the government could not justify the 
collection and analysis of DNA by assuming that all individuals whose DNA was collected 
would be more likely than others to commit crimes in the future.
113
 
The dissent did not find persuasive the idea that DNA profiling is the same as 
fingerprinting.  Unlike DNA, the science behind fingerprints and mug shots has not evolved to 
the point where each could be used for purposes other than identification.
114
  The dissent pointed 
out that the collection of DNA required obtaining evidence that is found below the body’s 
                                                 
110
 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 421 (3d Cir. 2011). 
111
 Id.  
112
 Id. (quoting United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 836 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
113
 Id. at 422 (“[T]he Government may not assume that the subjects of the DNA collection are more likely to commit 
future crimes to justify the collection and analysis of their DNA.”). 
114
 Id. at 425. 
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surface, which is out of the public view.
115
  The dissent noted that photographs and fingerprints 
are primarily used to identify suspects, and to  ensure that the arrested individual   is in fact the 
person that law enforcement believes to have in custody (thus preventing a case for mistaken 
identity), but in this case, DNA was primarily used to solve crimes, and not for identification 
purposes.
116
  Ultimately, the dissent pointed to the Supreme Court’s historical recognition that 
“generalized interests in ‘law enforcement’ a[re] a particularly suspect type of government 
interest for Fourth Amendment purposes, and [the Court] has specifically held invalid other 
suspicionless search programs that are designed to ‘uncover evidence of ordinary criminal 
wrongdoing’ by the targets of the search.”117 
 
B. People v. Buza 
In People v. Buza,
118
 the California Appeals court dealt with a California statute that 
required felony-arrestees to submit a DNA sample, even if there was no “independent suspicion, 
a warrant or even a judicial or grand jury determination of probable cause. . . .”  The DNA 
sample would then be added to the state and federal DNA database.
119
  The California Appeals 
court found that the statute violated the Fourth Amendment because an arrestee’s expectation of 
                                                 
115
 Id.  
116
 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 425 (3d Cir. 2011) (“In the case of photographs and fingerprints, the 
Government’s primary interest is to ‘identify’ suspects in the traditional sense, i.e., to ‘ensure[ ] that the person who 
has been arrested is in fact the person law enforcement agents believe they have in custody.’  But with respect to 
DNA, the Government’s primary objective is to solve crimes.”) (quoting United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 
1104, 1113 (10th Cir. 2006)). 
117
 Id. at 428 (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000)). 
118
 People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (review granted, opinion superseded) (as of Oct. 10, 
2012, the California Supreme Court has not reviewed the case). 
119
 Id. at 783. 
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privacy was unreasonably disturbed.
120
  In arriving at this conclusion, the court applied the 
totality of the circumstances test.
121
 
The court first balanced the individual’s privacy rights against the governmental interests, 
by initially focusing on the convicted felons’ interests  followed by the interests of the arrestees 
and the government.
122
  The court noted that “[c]onvicted offenders are subject to ‘a broad range 
of [restrictions] that might infringe constitutional rights in free society’ and have ‘severely 
constricted expectations of privacy relative to the general citizenry.’”123  Additionally, the 
government has a strong interest in identifying and prosecuting offenders, promoting 
rehabilitation, and protecting the community.
124
  The court then shifted its focus to individuals’ 
status prior to conviction and pointed to the Friedman court, which noted that: 
[S]uspicionless searches of pretrial detainees had not previously been upheld for 
reasons other than prison security and emphasizing the United States Supreme 
Court’s statement in Schmerber . . . that “‘[t]he interests in human dignity and 
privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusion on the 
mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained.’”125 
 
The court also considered the governmental interest  in obtaining DNA  to identify 
arrestees.
126
  Ultimately, the court rejected the idea of obtaining DNA for identification purposes 
for two reasons.  First, the court reasoned that DNA sampling and fingerprinting are not 
analogous  because DNA sampling reveals more extensive personal information compared to 
DNA fingerprinting.
127
  Second, the definition of identification used by the government conflates 
                                                 
120
 Id.  
121
 Id. at 782. 
122
 Id. at 766-68. 
123
 Id. at 761 (quoting United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 833-34 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
124
 People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 761 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
125
 Id. at 763 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966) (citation omitted)). 
126
 Id. at 765. 
127
 Id. at 767. 
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identity verification with criminal investigation.
128
  The analogy between fingerprinting and 
DNA testing failed to consider that a DNA sample would contain the entire human genome 
(unlike a DNA profile), and that courts that have upheld DNA testing statutes dismissed the 
concern about the extent of personal information that would be available through  DNA samples 
by mistakenly believing  it to be equivalent to the information available through the DNA 
profile.
129
  The court was cautious about the DNA profile because the presence of genetic 
material in “junk DNA” has been questioned.130 
The court found the analogy between fingerprinting and DNA sampling to be problematic 
because fingerprinting was considered routine when the courts began applying the totality of the 
circumstances test to such situations.
131
  Since law enforcement began implementing 
fingerprinting as a routine booking procedure, it was not subject to the Fourth Amendment 
analysis and thus, it should not be the basis for concluding that DNA sampling is analogous to 
fingerprinting and therefore survives a Fourth Amendment analysis.
132
 
Additionally, the court found that DNA statutes conflated identification and investigation 
but in reality, courts have  distinguished between identification fingerprints and investigation 
                                                 
128
 Id.  
129
 Id. at 768 (“[Courts failed to consider] . . . the differences between a DNA profile and a DNA sample, including 
that the latter contains the entire human genome. In general, the cases upholding DNA testing statutes have 
dismissed concerns about the extent of the personal information contained in DNA samples by limiting their 
attention to the profile.”). 
130
 People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 768 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 
818 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004), citing W. Wayt Gibbs, The Unseen Genome: Gems Among the Junk, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, 
Nov. 2003, at 29). 
131
 Id. at 770 (“By the time the totality of the circumstances test was announced, ‘fingerprinting had long been 
informally deemed ‘routine.’’”) (quoting, Corey Preston, Faulty Foundations: How the False Analogy to Routine 
Fingerprinting Undermines the Argument for Arrestee DNA Sampling, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 510 
(2010)). 
132
 Id.  
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fingerprints.
133
  Ultimately, the court held that DNA sampling is being used for criminal 
investigation and not for identification.
134
 
 
C. The Significance of Junk DNA and the Effects of Storage 
 
The significance of “junk DNA” that is used in DNA profiles is debatable.  Essentially, 
“junk DNA” are “[t]hirteen loci (locations on the human genome) known as single tandem 
repeats, or ‘STRs,’ and are examined to produce the DNA profiles that are standard for databases 
in the United States.”135  The discrepancy lies in whether “junk DNA” truly is junk or is more 
valuable than previously thought. 
Elizabeth Joh, Professor at the University of California, Davis School of Law, stated that 
“[t]he defense that current DNA sampling techniques target only ‘junk’ DNA, and thus cannot 
reveal medical information, should not assuage privacy concerns, however, as some markers 
now thought to be meaningless may be (and have been) found to contain predictive medical 
information as the science progresses.”136  The argument against the government’s retention of 
arrestees’ DNA samples is that such samples may disclose personal family relationships, 
predispositions to disease, physical attributes, and ancestry.
137
 Adversaries point to the fact that 
biologists have discovered functions for some types of “junk DNA,”138 for instance, “[t]he 
                                                 
133
 Id. at 770-71 (“[For fingerprinting,] . . . courts have drawn a distinction between identification-fingerprints taken 
‘to verify that the person who is fingerprinted is really who he says he is,’ and investigation-fingerprints taken ‘to 
connect [the person fingerprinted] to a crime with which he was not already connected.’”) (quoting United States v. 
Garcia-Beltran, 389 F.3d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
134
 Id. at 774.  
135
 Simon A. Cole, Is the “Junk” DNA Designation Bunk?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 54, 56 (2007) (footnote 
omitted). 
136
 Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. 
REV. 857, 870 (2006). 
137
 Cole, supra note135, at 55 (citing Tania Simoncelli, Dangerous Excursions: The Case Against Expanding 
Forensic DNA Databases to Innocent Persons, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 390, 392 (2006)). 
138
 Id. at 56 (footnote omitted). 
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European DNA Profiling Group recognized early on in the application of STRs for human 
identity testing that ‘it is likely that many or possibly most STRs will eventually be shown to be 
useful in following a genetic disease or other genetic trait within a family.’”139  Ultimately, those 
opposed to “junk DNA” believe that “[f]orensic STRs are potentially significant because they 
may turn out to be useful for predicting physical traits . . . [and that] it is misleading to claim that 
forensic STRs have no medical significance, are devoid of information, or are completely 
innocuous from a privacy standpoint.”140 
Conversely, proponents of the retention of “junk DNA” state that “forensic STRs are 
non-functional ‘junk,’ [and that] the genetic data stored in databases is meaningless.”141 
Additionally, recent theories  do not imply that STRs have the potential to contain predictive 
medical information.
142
  In actuality, RNA molecules may be the true culprits that are 
transmitting parallel information and thus, it is a leap to conclude that forensic STRs (something 
that does not even generate RNA molecules) are capable of predicting diseases.
143
  Although 
some medical genetic researchers claim to have found a linkage between a genetic disease and a 
core STR marker, the findings are usually tentative, and can later be proven false; therefore, the 
                                                 
139
 John M. Butler, Genetics and Genomics of Core Short Tandem Repeat Loci Used in Human Identity Testing, 51 
J. FORENSIC SCI. 253, 260 (2006). 
140
 Cole, supra note 135, at 59. 
141
 Id. at 57. 
142
 D.H. Kaye, Science Fiction and Shed DNA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 65 (2006) (“[E]merging theories do not 
imply that STRs ‘contain predictive medical information.’”).  Id. at 64 (“There are various types of non-protein-
coding DNA, including pseudogenes (relics of once-functioning genes), viral DNA inserted by retrotransposons, and 
short tandem repeats (STRs, the type of markers used in forensic identification). Recent discoveries establish that 
some intergenic DNA (not “markers”) is biologically significant, but no forensic STR locus has been found to be 
predictive.”).  
143
 Id. at 65 (“[RNA molecules] . . . ‘may be transmitting parallel information . . .’ [and it would be] a leap . . . [to 
conclude] that the forensic STRs—which do not generate RNA molecules and are not conserved across species—are 
functional or that their length polymorphisms will prove useful for predicting disease.”) (citing Gibbs, supra note 
130, at 46, 49-50 (quoting John S. Mattick)). 
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findings should not be a reason to prevent the continued use of the STR locus.
144
 Proponents of 
“junk DNA” use believe that forensic STRs do not possess as great a threat as many may 
consider.
145
 
 
D. Treatment of Abandoned DNA 
 
“‘Abandoned DNA’ is any amount of human tissue capable of DNA analysis and 
separated from a targeted individual’s person inadvertently or involuntarily, but not by police 
coercion.”146  The Fourth Amendment does not protect abandoned or voluntarily discarded 
property because any expectation of privacy that may have existed becomes irrelevant the 
moment it is abandoned.
147
  To determine whether or not a piece of property was abandoned, the 
Fourth Amendment test is primarily concerned with whether the owner initially possessed an 
expectation of privacy interest in the allegedly abandoned property.
148
  When dealing with 
abandoned DNA, proponents of the covert collection of DNA argue “that by spitting out gum, 
discarding a disposable coffee cup, or throwing away a used tissue,”149 the individual  intended 
to abandon the item, and any DNA that may have been contained on that item.
150
  
                                                 
144
 Butler, supra note 139, at 259 (“It is important to keep in mind that even though medical genetic researchers 
claim to have shown linkage between a particular disease gene and a core STR marker, these types of findings are 
often tentative and should not prevent the continued use of the STR locus . . . In fact, many times these linkage 
“findings” can later be proven false . . .  .”). 
145
 Cole, supra note 135, at 63. 
146
 Joh, supra note 136, at 859. 
147
 Williamson v. Maryland, 993 A.2d 626, 634 (Md. 2010) (“Fourth Amendment protection . . . does not extend to 
property that is abandoned or voluntarily discarded, because any expectation of privacy in the item searched is 
discarded upon abandonment.”). 
148
 Id. at 635 (“The test for determining whether property is abandoned for purposes of the Fourth Amendment . . . 
focuses on whether the owner of the property retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the article alleged to be 
abandoned.”). 
149
 United States v. Davis, 657 F. Supp. 2d 630, 649 (D. Md. 2009). 
150
 Williamson v. Maryland, 993 A.2d 626, 641 (Md. 2010) (citing Davis, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 649).  
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In Williamson v. Maryland, the court held that the DNA that was obtained from 
abandoned property should be construed with the reasoning proposed by the DNA proponents.
151
  
In terms of uploading the abandoned DNA into a database, the Williamson court
152
 stated that the 
government had a legitimate interest in identifying a person involved in a crime and had a 
legitimate interest in vindicating those who are falsely convicted.
153
 The court questioned the 
possibility of achieving such results if it is deemed unlawful to upload an individual’s DNA 
sample to discover the identity of that individual.
154
   
Similarly, in State v. Athan,
155
 the court held that there were no recognized privacy 
interests for abandoned DNA, and that the government had a legitimate purpose to collect 
abandoned DNA for identification purposes.
156
  Additionally, in Piro v. State,
157
 the court 
acknowledged the power of DNA evidence and the amount of personal information it may 
reveal; but, the court rejected the DNA suppression motion because the court  was persuaded that 
that although some appellate decisions (dealing with the collection of DNA from blood samples 
and cheek swabs from offenders) suggested that a privacy interest existed in the information that 
is included in a DNA databank, there were no appellate decisions that found warrantless DNA 
testing to be unconstitutional.
158
 
 
 
 
                                                 
151
 Id. at 642. 
152
 Williamson v. Maryland, 993 A.2d 626 (Md. 2010). 
153
 Id. at 642 (“[T]here is a ‘legitimate governmental interest in identifying persons involved with crimes, including 
vindicating those falsely convicted.’”) (quoting Maryland v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 43 (Md. 2004)). 
154
 Williamson, 993 A.2d at 642. 
155
 State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27 (Wash. 2007). 
156
 Id. at 43. 
157
 Piro v. State, 190 P.3d 905 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008). 
158
 Id. at 911. 
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III. PERSONAL ANALYSIS 
Using the Fourth Amendment as a blanket that protects against every aspect of a 
controversial technological advancement is an unacceptable and dangerous extension of its 
scope.
159
  The Constitution cannot and will not provide a shield against every controversial 
technological advancement if it is reasonable; thus, if society is against a particular procedure, it 
is for the legislature (as a representative of society) to determine what should be allowed and the 
limits (if any) that should exist.
160
  Such is the case with DNA sampling because a blanket 
protection would exceed the scope of protection established by the Fourth Amendment.
161
  
Instead, there should be restrictions on the type of information that can be obtained as opposed to 
restricting collection of any and all information from a DNA sample; otherwise, many similar 
technological advances that serve legitimate governmental interests will become unavailable due 
to an overbroad interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
162
  
 
A. Which Test is Applicable? 
The correct test for determining the constitutionality of DNA sampling is the totality of 
the circumstances test.  The special needs test should be reserved for “those exceptional 
                                                 
159
 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a 
general constitutional ‘right to privacy.’”); United States v. McKeever, 5 F.3d 863, 866 (5th Cir. 1993) (“The Fourth 
Amendment does not provide blanket protection against searches and seizures on private property.  Rather, the 
Fourth Amendment protects those areas in which citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy.”). 
160
 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior 
decisions is . . . first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”) (emphasis added); Maryland v. Buie¸ 494 
U.S. 325, 331 (1990) (“It goes without saying that the Fourth Amendment bars only unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”) (emphasis added). 
161
 See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 390 (3d Cir. 2011) (“As arrestees have a diminished expectation of 
privacy in their identities, and DNA collection from arrestees serves important law enforcement interests, [the court] 
concludes that such collection is reasonable and does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”) (emphasis added). 
162
 See Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Act imposes stringent restrictions 
on the entire collection and profiling process. . . . These restrictions allow the Government to use an offender’s DNA 
profile in substantially the same way that the Government uses fingerprint and photographic evidence . . . .”). 
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circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the 
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.”163  The acquisition of a DNA sample is 
not as severe an intrusion into privacy as the dissent argued in Mitchell.  Forced DNA extraction 
should be subject to a less rigorous Fourth Amendment analysis in order to better protect the 
Fourth Amendment’s integrity when utilizing the special needs exception.164  The special needs 
test is reserved for non-law enforcement purposes, which is  irrelevant to DNA sampling being 
used for law-enforcement purposes.
165
  Ultimately, if the courts were to implement the special 
needs test for DNA sampling, then every instance of sampling would need to be examined on a 
case-by-case basis, as the circumstances are important in determining whether the special needs 
exception was appropriately applied.
166
  
 
B. DNA Sampling and the Totality of the Circumstances Test 
Under the totality of the circumstances test, the courts will determine whether the taking 
of the DNA served a greater governmental interest than the injury resulting from the 
corresponding intrusion into the individual’s privacy.167  As stated earlier, courts have considered 
the following factors when balancing the interests of the government and those of the individual: 
the extent of the intrusion, the expectation of privacy of the individual, the need of DNA 
                                                 
163
 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
164
 Charles J. Nerko, Assessing Fourth Amendment Challenges to DNA Extraction Statutes After Samson v. 
California, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 947 (2008) (“[U]sing a less rigorous approach in the compelled DNA 
extraction context will more rigorously protect the Fourth Amendment by preserving the integrity of the special 
needs exception.”). 
165
 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[Special needs] . . . involve searches conducted for 
important non-law enforcement purposes in contexts where adherence to the warrant-and-probable cause 
requirement would be impracticable.”). 
166
 See id. at 828 (“[W]arrantless searches under a special needs rubric . . . demands some underlying motivation 
apart from the government’s general interest in law enforcement.”). 
167
 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 112-13 (2001) (“[R]easonableness is determined by assessing, on the 
one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is 
needed to promote legitimate governmental interests.”). 
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collection as a legitimate governmental interest, the safeguards implemented, and expungement 
possibilities.  
 
1. The Extent of the Intrusion and the Arrestee’s  
Expectation of Privacy 
 
Counterarguments to the governmental interest focus on the theory that arrestees possess 
a greater expectation of privacy than convicted felons or probationers.
168
  However, as 
mentioned earlier, courts have held that an arrestee’s expectation of privacy is not free from 
intrusion.
169
  The intrusion from a DNA sample can range from a buccal swab to a blood 
extraction.
170
  These procedures do not severely intrude a person’s dignity  because blood tests 
are given during annual checkups and while donating blood, and buccal swabs are used to find 
potential bone marrow donors.
171
  These activities are standard.
172
  On a scale between 
Schmerber (where the court allowed the taking of a DNA sample over the arrestee’s objection)173 
to Winston (where the court did not allow the surgical intrusion of the arrestee who would be 
placed under general anesthesia),
174
 the taking of a DNA sample from an arrestee falls much 
                                                 
168
 See Julie Rikelman, Justifying Forcible DNA Testing Schemes Under the Special Needs Exception to the Fourth 
Amendment: A Dangerous Precedent, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 41, 75 (2007) (“The expectation of privacy of those 
merely arrested of a crime is much higher than that of an individual in prison or on probation or supervised release 
after a conviction.”). 
169
 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (“[C]onclude that the attempt to secure evidence of blood-
alcohol content in this case was an appropriate incident to petitioner’s arrest.”); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 
(1985) (“Schmerber recognized society’s judgment that blood tests do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition 
on an individual’s personal privacy and bodily integrity. Weighed against these individual interests is the 
community’s interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence. This interest is of course of great 
importance.”). 
170
 Holden Memorandum, supra note 7. 
171
 See Donating Bone Marrow, PUGET SOUND BLOOD CTR., http://www.psbc.org/programs/marrow.htm (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2012) (stating that a buccal swab is used to collect enough cells of the proper type); Richard Sine, 
Men’s Health Tune-up Schedule: Medical Tests, WEBMD (MAR. 24, 2008), http://men.webmd.com/guide/mens-
health-tuneup-schedule-medical-tests (stating that blood tests for diabetes are routine). 
172
 See supra note 171. 
173
 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 757. 
174
 Winston, 470 U.S. at 753. 
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closer to the former.  The arrestee is not under any anesthesia, and he does not endure any 
surgical intrusion; any intrusion that occurs would not be intended to obtain a piece of 
evidence.
175
  For these reasons, the procedure of taking a DNA sample  does not severely intrude 
on an arrestee’s expectation of privacy. Thus, the focus of the intrusion into privacy should be on 
what  is taken: “junk DNA.” 
Presently, the “junk DNA” separated from the DNA sample serves no known purpose 
(other than identification).
176
  The possibility that “junk DNA” (more specifically the “junk 
DNA” taken by the FBI)177 may reveal information in the future should not serve as a bar to the 
entire process.  If such were the case, then fingerprints should be subject to this analysis as there 
is a possibility that fingerprints may reveal more than is currently known.
178
  However, since 
fingerprint technology is used for identification purposes, there are no substantial concerns about 
the information that may be revealed through fingerprints.
179
  The same can be said for DNA 
sampling.  As long as the information from a DNA sample is restricted to the” junk DNA,” and 
is used solely for identification, there are no reasonable concerns for intrusions into privacy. 
                                                 
175
 See id. at 754 (holding that it is unreasonable to have a compelled surgical intrusion for obtaining evidence 
because the  procedure requires the arrestee to be under general anesthesia, which results in uncertainty about the 
medical risks. “Surgery without the patient’s consent, performed under a general anesthetic to search for evidence of 
a crime, involves a virtually total divestment of the patient’s ordinary control over surgical probing beneath the 
skin.”). 
176
 H.R. REP. NO. 106-900(I), at 27 (2000) (“Moreover, the genetic markers used for forensic DNA testing were 
purposely selected because they are not associated with any known physical or medical characteristics, providing 
further assurance against the use of convicted offender DNA profiles for purposes other than law enforcement 
identification.”). 
177
 See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA Index System, FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Oct. 24, 
2012) (stating that the thirteen loci are: CSF1PO, FGA, THO1, TPOX, VWA, DeS1358, D5S818, D7S1179, 
D13S317, D16S539, D18S51, D21S11). 
178
 See Kaye, supra note 142, at 64 n.13 (“Some features of fingerprints are associated with diseases . . . .” (citing 
Julian Verbov, Clinical Significance and Genetics of Epidermal Ridges—A Review of Dermatoglyphics, 54 J. 
INVESTIGATIVE DERMATOLOGY 261, 261 (1970) (“Study of the patterns of the epidermal ridges of finger, palm, and 
sole can serve as an aid to diagnosis of many diseases . . . .”))). 
179
 See Cole, supra note 135, at 61 (“[W]idespread view of fingerprints as devoid of information stems from a social 
decision not to invest in research exploring correlations between fingerprint patterns and race, ethnicity, disease, and 
behavioral propensities, not from a biological absence of such correlations.”). 
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2. Is There a Legitimate Governmental Interest? 
Another factor to be considered when balancing both parties’ interests is the 
governmental interest in DNA sampling.
180
  The most compelling governmental interest that is 
satisfied through the collection of DNA sampling is identification.
181
  DNA provides the 
government with the ability to identify a suspect in a crime and prevents misidentification (i.e., 
wrongly convicting an individual).  Fingerprinting  is not always a reliable method to identify the 
proper suspects of a crime.
182
  Furthermore, fingerprints can be avoided by wearing gloves, 
which means that it is more likely that fingerprints will not always be left at the scene of the 
crime, making it difficult to identify suspects.
183
  On the other hand, it is more difficult to avoid 
leaving DNA because DNA can be disposed of through skin cells, saliva, or hair.
184
 Resultantly, 
DNA  is helpful in identifying a suspect in a greater number of situations and to a greater 
accuracy.
185
  The government has a legitimate interest in identifying a suspect  and in preventing 
the wrongful accusation of an individual. 
 
 
 
                                                 
180
 See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 403-05 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating governmental interest is a factor). 
181
 See id. at 413 (“Most compelling is the Government’s strong interest in identifying arrestees.”). 
182
 See Jason Felch, Solving Crimes Using Fingerprints is an Inexact Science, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2009, available 
at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/20/opinion/oe-felch20 (“In 2004, the Boston Police Department was forced 
to shut down its fingerprint lab after a ‘glaring mistake’ led to a wrongful conviction.  That same year, the FBI’s top 
fingerprint analysts were forced to admit that they were wrong after claiming to be ‘absolutely confident’ that a 
fingerprint had linked a lawyer in Oregon to the Madrid train bombings.”). 
183
See Corinna Kruse, Forensic Evidence: Materializing Bodies, Materializing Crimes, 17 EUR. J. WOMEN’S STUD. 
363, 367 (2010) (“Criminals can (and often do) wear gloves, which prevent leaving fingerprints; not everyone’s 
touch leaves equally distinct traces; nor do all surfaces receive and retain fingerprints, and sufficiently clear 
fingerprints at that, equally well.”). 
184
 Id. (“[T]races that contain DNA are not rare.  Expelling tiny droplets of saliva when speaking, or shedding skin 
cells leave traces that contain DNA.”). 
185
 See Advancing Criminal Justice Through DNA Technology, DNA INITIATIVE, http://www.dna.gov/basics/ (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2012) (stating that each person has a unique DNA and that DNA can be used to solve previous 
unsolvable cases and implicate or eliminate a suspect). 
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3. With Sufficient Safeguards, are Warrants Even Necessary? 
The Buza Court proposed a broader solution that, if taken, may serve as the proper 
intermediate step that would help protect the rights of arrestees while still allowing the benefits 
of DNA sampling.
186
  However, judicial intervention is an unnecessary step because DNA 
samples are only taken upon arrest and, in order to arrest an individual, a law enforcement officer 
must have probable cause.
187
  At the point of arrest, since the officer has to have probable cause 
to detain an individual for a period of time, the arrestee no longer enjoys the same expectation of 
privacy as an ordinary citizen.
188
  Additionally, “[a] warrant requirement will not make much 
difference to a society that, under the sway of a naive and discredited theory of genetic 
determinism, is willing to lock people away on the basis of their genes.”189  Since genetics 
already plays a vast role in society for convicting an individual,  requiring a warrant to take a 
DNA sample in order to verify whether an individual is the proper suspect, would be 
counterintuitive to the society’s reliance on genetics.  Furthermore, judicial intervention is an 
unnecessary step that will result in judicial inefficiency. The proper step is to impose restrictions 
such as statutes limiting collection of DNA to “junk DNA.” Much like other DNA statutes, 
                                                 
186
 See People v. Buza, 129 Cal. 3d. 753, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (“[T]o the extent it requires felony arrestees to 
submit a DNA sample for law enforcement analysis and inclusion in the state and federal DNA databases, without 
independent suspicion, a warrant or even a judicial or grand jury determination of probable cause, unreasonably 
intrudes on such arrestees’ expectation of privacy and is invalid under the Fourth Amendment . . . .”). 
187
 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975) (“The standard for arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of 
facts and circumstances ‘sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (suspect) had committed or was 
committing an offense.’” (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964))). 
188
 See United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903, 910 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“An arrestee has a diminished expectation 
of privacy in his own identity. Probable cause has long been the standard which allowed an arrestee to be 
photographed, fingerprinted and otherwise be compelled to give information which can later be used for 
identification purposes.”); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[W]hen a suspect is arrested upon 
probable cause, his identification becomes a matter of legitimate state interest and he can hardly claim privacy in it. 
We accept this proposition because the identification of suspects is relevant not only to solving the crime for which 
the suspect is arrested, but also for maintaining a permanent record to solve other past and future crimes.”). 
189
 Kaye, supra note 142, at 66. 
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Congress can limit the crimes for which, DNA may be collected from arrestees.
190
  “The public 
can decide for itself whether and to what extent, the privacy risk offsets the benefits of genetic 
databases.”191  In that line of thought, it is up to Congress to control the use of DNA sampling, 
not the judiciary. 
It is a logical argument that a search warrant or judicial intervention would  prevent abuse 
but it does not have much weight.  The Pool court recognized that the statute already existed as 
an intermediate step to prevent abuse.
192
  The protections from the statute prevent a majority of 
individuals from taking advantage of private information and though not everyone will be 
deterred,  that is no reason to decline to implement a procedure, as there is no sanction that can 
deter every possible violator.
193
  If the fact that all violators are not deterred by sanctions was 
sufficient to dismiss procedures, then medical records could not be computerized because of the 
potential for someone to hack into the records.
194
  The point is that “[o]ur modern technological 
society cannot function in an atmosphere of privacy paralysis occasioned by a parade of “what 
ifs.”195 
With the DNA Act, the statute imposes penalties on improper use of the DNA 
information.  For instance, if a person, “by virtue of employment or official position, has 
possession of, or access to individually identifiable DNA information [and] . . . knowingly 
                                                 
190
 See State DNA Database Laws Qualifying Offenses, DNA RESOURCE (Sept. 2011), 
http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/statequalifyingoffenses2011.pdf (outlining the 50 states qualifying offenses 
for when a DNA sample can be taken from an arrestee). 
191
 Cole, supra note 135, at 63. 
192
 Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 912 (“Defendant’s argument that no data sequestration system is immune from abuse is 
no reason to disallow DNA identification sampling. The point is that such information cannot be used outside of the 
statute’s permissible purpose on pain of criminal penalties.”). 
193
 Id. 
194
 Id.  
195
 Id. 
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discloses such information,” that person will be fined not more than $100,000.196  Similarly, “[a] 
person who knowingly discloses a sample or result [under § 14135] . . . shall be fined not more 
than $250,000, or imprisoned for a period of not more than one year.”197  Besides use and 
disclosure, the Act also protects against unlawfully obtaining the DNA information.  “A person 
who, without authorization, knowingly obtains DNA samples or individually identifiable DNA 
information indexed in a database . . . shall be fined not more than $250,000, or imprisoned for a 
period of not more than one year, or both.”198  Besides these criminal penalties, the statute 
implements other safeguards to ensure the correct use of DNA sampling.
199
  Additionally, not 
only are there safeguards against the use and disclosure of DNA samples, but also against the 
laboratories that participate in the index system.
200
  These safeguards exist to ensure that the 
DNA samples remain private and that they are properly used.
201
  Furthermore, the safeguards in 
conjunction with the use of “junk DNA” render the requirement of a warrant or judicial 
intervention superfluous and redundant.  
Congress (being representatives of society) has deemed DNA sample extraction to be 
reasonable. If society does not agree with the legislation imposed by Congress, it should reach 
                                                 
196
 42 U.S.C. § 14133(c)(1) (2006). 
197
 42 U.S.C. § 14135e(c) (2006). 
198
 42 U.S.C. § 14133(c)(2) (2006). 
199
 See 42 U.S.C. § 14133(b) (2006) (stating that DNA test results can only be disclosed for identification purposes 
to criminal justice agencies, judicial proceedings, and criminal defense purposes); 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b) (2006) 
(stating the index is only to include information on DNA identification records and DNA analyses subject to certain 
standards); 42 U.S.C. § 14132(c) (2006) (“Access to the index established by [§ 14132] is subject to cancellation if 
the quality control and privacy requirements . . . are not met.”). 
200
 See M. Dawn Herkenham, Retention of Offender DNA Samples Necessary to Ensure and Monitor Quality of 
Forensic DNA Efforts: Appropriate Safeguards Exist to Protect the DNA Samples from Misuse, 34 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 380, 383 (2006) (“All laboratories participating in the National DNA Index System are required to generate 
their DNA records in accordance with the FBI Director’s Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Testing 
Laboratories  and Quality Assurance Standards for Convicted Offender DNA Databasing Laboratories.  These 
standards require that laboratories undergo an annual audit to monitor compliance with the standards.  At least once 
every two years, the audits must be conducted by persons external to the agency . . . .”). 
201
 See id. (“[E]xisting laws for confidentiality and limited disclosure serve as a balance against any potential for 
misuse of the DNA samples collected in connection with state and national offender DNA databases.”). 
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out to its representatives for changes, instead of attempting to extend the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment.  In the future, courts interpreting any similar state or Federal DNA statutes  should 
focus on the accompanying statutes that impose restrictions and criminal penalties on DNA 
collection, rather than trying to reach beyond the protections of the Fourth Amendment.  The 
proper safeguards that the courts should implement are restricting DNA collection to only those 
individuals who have been arrested on probable cause, and restrict the content to only “junk 
DNA.”  The “What Ifs” with “junk DNA” should not be taken into consideration unless there has 
been (if ever) definitive research proving that the “junk DNA” collected by Law Enforcement 
officials actually serves a more intimate purpose than identification.
202
  Anything different would 
result in unconstitutionality under the Fourth Amendment because the extent of what fingerprints 
can reveal is not yet completely known.
203
 
The Fourth Amendment cannot serve as a blanket protection for controversial issues that 
may arise.  Safeguards exist to protect areas that are outside the reach of the Fourth Amendment.  
If these safeguards are insufficient, then it is up to the citizenry to convince the legislature to 
either request new safeguards or eradicate the act altogether. 
 
C. Why DNA is a Natural Progression from Fingerprints 
The argument that DNA sampling is not a natural technological progression from 
fingerprints does not take into account the significant advances in fingerprint technology.  With 
more research devoted to fingerprinting technology, the quantity and type of information that 
may be revealed via fingerprints could be significant.  For instance, latent fingerprints may be 
                                                 
202
 See United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903, 912 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“Our modern technological society cannot 
function in an atmosphere of privacy paralysis occasioned by a parade of ‘what ifs.’”). 
203
 Kaye, supra note 142, at 64. 
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able to reveal drug abuse.
204
  The sweat that excretes from the skin’s pores can be transferred, 
leaving unique impressions.
205
  Furthermore, if more finances were devoted to fingerprints, drugs 
would not be the only aspect detectable from fingerprints.
206
  “Cancer, diabetes, heart disease 
and other medical conditions produce specific chemicals also secreted in sweat and oil.  By 
tweaking the antibodies on the particles, forensic scientists could test for a variety of medical 
conditions.”207  Granted, these fingerprints are not exactly the same as those taken during a 
booking procedure after an arrest.  However, as technology advances, so do the methods of 
obtaining fingerprints, which could make fingerprints more reliable and in essence begin to 
reveal more information.
208
  
Additionally, genetic exceptionalists argue that DNA is too unique to be analogous to 
fingerprints and therefore, it warrants its own analysis.
209
  However, genetic exceptionalism fails 
to consider the ability of fingerprints to contain hereditary information.
210
  Those against the 
genetic exceptionalists’ views argue that the full capabilities of fingerprints are not yet certain, 
stating that “the widespread view of fingerprints as devoid of information stems from a social 
decision not to invest in research exploring correlations between fingerprint patterns and race, 
                                                 
 
204
 See Otto S. Wolfbeis, Nanoparticle-Enhanced Flurescence Imaging of Latent Fingerprints Reveals Drug Abuse, 
48 ANGEW. CHEM. INT. ED. 2268, 2268 (2009) (stating that the use of nanoparticle-enhanced fluorescence imaging 
of fingerprints may reveal drug abuse). 
205
 Id. (“[Sweat] . . . is excreted through the pores in the skin and deposited on the surface of the skin, from where it 
can be transferred to another surface . . . leave[s] an impression on the ridge pattern . . . [which is unique.]”). 
206
 See Cole, supra note 135, at 61 (“[T]he widespread view of fingerprints as devoid of information stems from a 
social decision). 
207
 Eric Bland, Fingerprints Can Reveal Drug Use, Medical History, DISCOVERY NEWS (Dec. 10, 2008), 
http://dsc.discovery.com/news/2008/12/10/fingerprint-drugs.html. 
208
 See Messmer, supra note 27 (discussing the FBI’s switch to the Advanced Fingerprint Information Technology 
which goes “beyond fingerprint identification to other biometrics, including latent palm prints and facial 
recognition.”); Alice Lipowicz, FBI Deploys Faster Fingerprint ID System, GOV’T COMPUTER NEWS (Mar. 9, 
2011), http://gcn.com/articles/2011/03/09/fbi-deploys-faster-fingerprint-identification-system.aspx (stating that the 
FBI’s “Next Generation Identification System provides automated fingerprint and latent search capabilities, storage 
and electronic data exchange.”). 
209
 Joh, supra note 136, at 869. 
210
 Cole, supra note 135, at 61 (“[G]enetic exceptionalism incorrectly portrays fingerprints as devoid of hereditary 
information.”). 
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ethnicity, disease, and behavioral propensities, not from a biological absence of such 
correlations.”211  In fact, there are features in fingerprints that are associated with diseases.212  
Thus, fingerprints reveal more information than just identity.
213
 
Essentially, “fingerprint identification technology” is separated from the technology that 
would allow fingerprints to reveal much more information than identification.  CODIS separates 
DNA that is used for identification purposes from the DNA that reveals greater personal 
information about an individual.
214
 Thus, the analogy that DNA sampling is a natural 
technological progression of fingerprints is accurate if one were to concentrate on exactly what 
DNA sampling focuses on: identification.
215
 
Then, the natural question is if there are technological advances in fingerprint technology, 
why do law enforcement groups need DNA “fingerprints”?  As previously stated, identifying an 
individual that committed a crime is not always an easy task (at least when implementing 
traditional methods such as fingerprints), and many criminals use gloves to cover up their 
fingerprints or only leave partial prints at the scene of the crime.
216
  DNA sampling allows for 
                                                 
211
 Id. 
212
 Kaye, supra note 142, at 64 (footnote omitted) (“Some features in fingerprints are associated with diseases, and 
research into this aspect of dermatoglyphics continues to this day.”). 
213
 Id. (“[The] assertion that fingerprints ‘cannot reveal any more information [than identity] about the person from 
whom they have been collected’ is mistaken.”) (citing Joh, supra note 136, at 870). 
214
 See H.R. REP. NO. 106-900(I), at 27 (2000) (“[T]he effect of the system is to provide a kind of genetic fingerprint 
which uniquely identifies an individual, but does not provide a basis for determining or inferring anything else about 
the person.”). 
215
 But see Corey Preston, Faulty Foundations: How the False Analogy to Routine Fingerprinting Undermines the 
Argument for Arrestee DNA Sampling, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 476 (2010) (“[T]he ‘technological 
progression’ argument ignores the obvious conclusion that with ‘progression’ comes legitimate substantive 
differences between the two types of evidence, and the intrusions on privacy those differences represent.”). 
216
 See Kruse, supra note 183, at 367 (2010) (“Criminals can (and often do) wear gloves, which prevent leaving 
fingerprints; not everyone’s touch leaves equally distinct traces; nor do all surfaces receive and retain fingerprints, 
and sufficiently clear fingerprints at that, equally well.”). 
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greater reliability, greater opportunity to identify the suspect, and a greater protection against 
wrongly accusing an individual.
217
 
 
D. Abandoned DNA and DNA Sampling 
As stated, courts should focus not on the procedure or process of taking DNA, but rather 
on what is taken.  Therefore, it makes sense to relate DNA sampling to abandoned DNA because 
in both instances, DNA is taken.  The main difference between abandoned DNA and DNA 
obtained after arrest is that with abandoned DNA, the individual is unaware about his DNA 
being collected and law enforcement could indefinitely keep his DNA in the records without that 
individual’s knowledge, while with the DNA obtained after arrest, the individual is aware that 
law enforcement took his DNA and he can expunge the DNA records pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
14132(d)(1)(A) (if there was no conviction).
218
  If there are no privacy concerns that arise from 
abandoned DNA and no restrictions on abandoned DNA, then DNA sampling of arrestees should 
be considered less of a concern.
219
  Theoretically, if DNA sampling of arrestees is not allowed, 
police could follow an individual around, wait for that individual to dispose of a DNA sample 
and then collect it before the arrest.
220
 With the current DNA statute, there are specific 
protections that are not afforded with abandoned DNA collection.
221
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 DNA Evidence Basics, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (Aug. 9, 2012), 
http://www.nij.gov/topics/forensics/evidence/dna/basics/welcome.htm (stating that each person has a unique DNA 
pattern which can be used to implicate or eliminate a suspect in criminal investigations). 
218
 See 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d)(1)(A)(ii) (2006) (stating that the DNA analysis of a person should be expunged from 
the index when “a certified copy of a final court order establishing that such charge has been dismissed or has 
resulted in an acquittal or that no charge was filed within the applicable time period.”). 
219
 See State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 43 (Wash. 2007) (“No recognized privacy interest exists in voluntarily discarded 
saliva and a legitimate government purpose in collecting a suspect’s discarded DNA exists for identification 
purposes.”). 
220
 See Williamson v. Maryland, 993 A.2d 626, 641 (Md. 2010) (“[T]he voluntary abandonment of the McDonald’s 
cup did not implicate an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment.”). 
221
 See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA Index System, FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Oct. 26, 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Under the totality of the circumstances test, the governmental interest is  balanced against 
the individual’s interest in privacy.  The government has a legitimate interest  in collecting DNA 
samples from arrestees as it is necessary for identification.  There is no question as to whether 
DNA sampling constitutes a search, but the procedure of collecting DNA is not intrusive or 
unconstitutional; rather the constitutionality of DNA sampling rests on the material seized.  The 
fact that the material seized is “junk DNA”—combined with the safeguards implemented in the 
DNA Act, the governmental interest and the diminished expectation of privacy of arrestees—
eliminates the necessity of a warrant to obtain a DNA sample and removes any Fourth 
Amendment violation concerns. The Fourth Amendment should not be a blanket protection for 
controversial issues that may arise. Preferably, if the issue is outside the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment, then it is up to Congress to establish the proper safeguards to prevent any abuse 
that may arise. If those safeguards are insufficient, then the people must voice their opinion and 
either demand amendments to those safeguards or removal of the Act altogether. Under the 
totality of the circumstances, DNA fingerprinting meets the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment and therefore, it is constitutional. 
                                                                                                                                                             
2012) (“Access to [computers containing CODIS] is limited to only those individuals authorized to use CODIS and 
approved by the FBI. Communications between participating federal, state, and local laboratories occur over a wide 
area network accessible to only criminal justice agencies approved by the FBI. Pursuant to federal law . . . DNA data 
is confidential. Access is restricted to criminal justice agencies for law enforcement identification purposes.”). 
